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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DAY & NIGHT HEATING COMPANY,

INC., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.

Case No.
10811

C. M. RUFF,

Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The Plaintiff and Appellant, Day & Night Heating
Company, Inc., performed services under a contract with
Reed S. Tew, a general contractor, for construction of a
home on land belonging to Defendant, C. M. Ruff.
The contractor failed to pay a balance of $930.00 and
the Plaintiff brought this action based on Title 14-2-1
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and Title 14-2-2 Utah Code
Armotated, 1953. This action was brought for the reason-
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able value of materials furnished and labor performed by
the Plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Plaintiff's Complaint was filed in the Lower Court
on September 9th, 1966 (R-1, 2), and an answer was filed
on October 21st, 1966 (R-3, 4). A motion for judgment on
a pleadings was filed on December 2nd, 1966 (R-7) with
a notice calling the same for a hearing on December 7th,
1966 (R-8). On December 7th, 1966, at the time of the
hearing, counsel for the Defendant filed a memorandum
in support of his motion (R-9, 10, 11, 12). Counsel for
Plaintiff evidently had no opportunity to file a written
answering memorandum. Judgment of dismissal was entered by the Court on the 8th day of December, 1966 (R13) after having heard the argument of counsel.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Lower
Court and for trial of the questions of fact raised in the
pleadings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is the owner of the
property located on 1370 Fillmore Street in Salt Lake
City, Utah, and that the Defendant contracted with one
Reed S. Tew as a general contractor for the construction of improvements on that property. The Plaintiff performed improvements on the property and was not paid
in full for said improvements consisting of material and
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labor, and the balance of $930.00 was and still is due and
owing (R-1, 2).
Title 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as follows:
"14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.
-The owner of any interest in land entering into a
contract, involving $500.00 or more, for the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from the
contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned
for the faithful performance of the contract and
prompt payment for material furnished and labor
performed under the contract. Such bond shall run
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest
may appear; and any person who has furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such
building, structure or improvement, payment for
which has not been made, shall have a direct right of
action against the sureties upon such bond for the
reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor
performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the
prices agreed upon; which right of action shall accrue
forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or
default in the performance, of the work provided for
in the con tract.
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to
any person interested, upon request."
Title 14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was amended
in the 36th regular session of the Legislature in such a
manner as to become Law on the 15th day of May, 1965,
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with the amended provision. Before amendment, the statute read as follows:
"14-2-2. Failure to require bond-Direct liability.Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter,
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient
bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall
be personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however,
in any case the prices agreed upon."
After amendment the following words were added:
"actions to recover on such liability shall be commenced
within one year from the last date the last materials were
furnished or labor performed."
The last materials provided and labor performed was
on or about December 1st, 1964. Plaintiff's Complaint was
filed on September 9th, 1966. At the time materials and
labor were provided, Plaintiff contends that the Three
Year Statute of Limitations would apply, pursuant to
Title 78-12-26 ( 4) which reads:
"78-12-26. Within three years.-Within three years:
... ( 4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this State, "other than for a penalty or for a
forfeiture under the Laws of this State, except
wherein special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the Statutes of this State."
A few months following the provision of labor and materials but within the then existing statute of limitations,
the 36th Legislature of the State of Utah provided for a
one year statute of limitations on actions brought under
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Title 14-2-2. QUERY: Whether the Three Year Statute of
Limitations in existence at the time the material and
labor were supplied governs the case or whether the one
year statute of limitations provided by the Legislature
in the interim period should govern.
The Defendant further claims that the remedy provided for the Plaintiff under Title 14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, effects and works a penalty and that the
statute of limitations on a penalty is limited to one year:
''78-12-29. Within one year: ...
( 2) An action upon a statute for a penalty for forfeiture where the action is given to an individual or
to an individual and estate, except when the statute
imposing it prescribes a different limitation."
ARGUMENT
Point 1
LEGISLATION OCCURRING DURING THE RUNNING
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BUT PRIOR TO
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAVING EXPIRED,
WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, IS PROSPECTIVE AND NOT RETROSPECTIVE.
Vol. 34 American Jurisprudence, Limitation of Actions,
Sec. 43 states:
"Although as already has been noted, it is within the
power of the Legislature to create a statute of limitations, or to change the period of limitation previously
fixed, and to make such statute or changes applicable
to existing causes of action, provided a reasonable
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time is given by the new Law for the commencement
of suit before the bar takes effect. Nevertheless, a
statute changing the limitation is not ordinarily construed as having a retrospective effect. On the contrary, in most jurisdictions statutes of limitations are
construed as prospective and not retrospective in
their operation; in the absence of the clear Legislative intent to the contrary, and the presumption is
against any intent on the part of the Legislature to
make such a statute retrospective. It has been said
that words of a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong and
imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to
them, or unless the intention of the Legislature cannot otherwise be satisfied."
"All authorities appear to approve of the rule that
statutes will be presumed to have been intended by
the Legislature to be prospective and not retrospective in their action where a retrospective effect
would work injustice and disturb rights acquired
under the former Law . . . "
The retrospective effect of statutes relating to causes
of action for debt depended upon a prior statute is annotated in American Law Reports, Vol. 77 pp. 1338 and
1340 wherein it is stated:
"Even though the Legislature may have the power
to enact retrospective laws, a construction which
gives to a statute a retrospective operation is not
favored, and such effect will not be given unless it is
distinctly expressed or clearly and necessarily implied that the statute is to have a retrospective effect . . . "
Page 1347 ibid, states:
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"An amendment to a statute which changes the period of limitation within which an action for debt
may be brought has been held not to apply to pending actions."
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has held with
respect to the retrospective and prospective construction
of statutes with the general rule stated by most of the
authorities, namely:
"Statutes should operate prospectively only unless
the words employed show a clear intention that they
should have a retrospective effect. This rule of construction of statutes should always be adhered to unless there is something on the face of the statute putting it beyond doubt that the Legislature meant to
operate retrospectively."
This is found in Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Company vs. Spry, Supreme Court of Utah, March 14th, 1898,
16 Utah 222, 52 Pacific 382.
This same rule of Law is repeated in re Ingraham's
Estate, Peterson vs. State Tax Commission, 148 Pacific
2nd. 340, 106 Utah 337; and in McCary vs. Utah State
Teachers' Retirement Board, et al, 177 Pacific 2nd 725,
111 Utah 257; also 77 Pacific 2nd 725, 111 Utah 251 and
Elizabeth B. Archer, Plaintiff and Appellant vs. Utah
State Land Board, 392 Pacific 2nd, 15 Utah 2nd 321.
In each of the foregoing cases the Court sustained the
general rule in the Ingraham's Estate case. There the
Court stated:
"That this Court is committed to the general rule
cannot be questioned, for in the case of Mercer Gold
Mining & Milling Company vs. Spry, 16 Utah 22, 52
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Pacific 382, Judge Miner said: 'Constitutions as well
as statutes should operate prospectively only unless
the words employed show a clear intention that they
should have a retrospective effect. This rule of construction should always be adhered to unless there is
something on the face of the statute putting it beyond
doubt that the Legislature meant it to operate retrospectively.' "
There do not appear to be any cases in the State of
Utah which are directly in point as to determining the
effect of the foregoing cited rule on a statute of limitations problem. However, if the general rule is applied, it
would appear that the statute of limitations newly enacted would be prospective in application and not retrospective.
In an Arizona case, Curtis, et al vs. Boquillas Land &
Cattle Co., states the general rule:
"Upon few if any branches of the Law is there such a
contrariety of view expressed by the Courts as upon
the effect to be given new statutes of limitation upon
causes of action existing at the time the statutes go
into effect. The general rule applied to such statutes
is that they will not be given a retrospective effect
unless it clearly appears that the Legislature so intended.''
The Court further stated, quoting Greland vs. Town of
Burgen, 34 New Jersey Law 438:
"That an act which merely limited the time within
which an action may be brought does not apply to
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a suit which though commenced after the passage
of the act was pending at the time the same took effect. The logic of this rule is apparent, particularly
when applied to the case like the one Bar where the
action was begun before the act took effect, and at
the time no other statute of limitations was in force
as to such actions. Under no cannon of construction
can a rule giving a retrospective effect to new statutes of limitations be made to apply to the case at
Bar."
In 53 Corpus Juris Secundum, Limitations of Actions,
Section 4(d), it is stated:
''In the absence of language making such construction necessary, an act of limitation will not be construed so as to make it apply to actions p~nding, or
to defenses that have been pleaded at the time the
statute goes into effect, particularly where the statute, if given a retrospective effect, will absolutely bar
the action at the date of the passage of the act, and a
statute which merely limits the time within which an
action may be brought is not susceptible of a construction which will make it apply to a suit pending
at a time such act takes effect, although the suit is
commenced after the passage of the act, especially
where at the time the action was brought there was
no other statute in force as to such actions. It has
been held that an act expressly alluding to rights of
action accrued before it took effect will not embrace
actions pending at the time of its passage."
This is the case at Bar. The Legislature, in placing a
statute of limitations of one year on the provisions of
Title 14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, recognized the
existing and continuing causes of action in existence at
the time of the passage of the statute, and therefore tac-
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itly recognized the continuing effect of causes of action

in existence but not filed when the legislation was passed.

It has been argued that there is, in effect, a postponement of operation of a time for the statute to take effect,
that it ordinarily evidences a legislative intent to make
any statute of retrospective effect.

In the State of Utah the postponement of the effective
date of the statute herein referred to, occurs not because
of any specific intent on the part of the Legislature to
grant notice and an opportunity for all parties to take
action before the new statute of limitations would take
effect, but occurs because of a constitutional provision in
the Constitution of the State of Utah. The Constitution of
the State of Utah, Article 6, Sec. 25:
"All acts shall be officially published and no act shall
take effect until so published nor until sixty days
after the adjournment of the session at which it
passed unless the Legislature, by a vote of two-thirds
of all the members elected to each house, shall otherwise direct."
Point 2
THAT THE APPLICATION OF TITLE 14-2-2 UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS NOT A PENALTY.
Title 78-12-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states:
"78-12-29. Within one year: ...
(2) An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given to an individual, or
to an individual and estate, except when the statute
imposing it prescribes a different limitation."
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It is the Defendant Respondent's position that a right of
action accruing under Title 14-2-2, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, is a penalty.

A similar statute to the Utah Statute is found in Vol. 28,
United States Code Annotated Sec. 2462 which reads as
follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress,
an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of
any civil fine, penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the
claim first accrued if, within the same period, the
offender or the property is found within the United
States in order that proper service may be made
thereon.''
The two statutes, although in different verbal form,
nevertheless constitute the same type of a prohibition
reflecting the reluctance of Courts to impose penalties
and forfeitures.
The United States Supreme Court has construed a penalty in the case of Meeker vs. Lehigh Valley Railroad
Company, Pennsylvania 1915, 35 Supreme Court 328, 236
U. S. 412, 59 Law Edition 644, as follows:
"Section 2462 (formerly 791) which places a limitation of five years upon any suit or prosecution for
any penalty or forfeiture pecuniary or otherwise accruing under the Laws of the United States, the
words penalty or forfeiture in this section refer to
something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law and do not include a liability imposed for the purpose of redressing a private injury,
even though the wrongful act be a public offense and
punishable as such."
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In Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works vs. Atlanta,
Tennessee, 1906, 27 Supreme Court 65, 203 U. S. 390, 51
Law Edition, 241, the Court held that treble damages recovering under Section 1 of Title 15 for a violation of
Anti-Trust Laws Section 1 of Title 15 are compensatory
damages and are not in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, and hence time for commencement of action to
recover such damages is limited by applicable state statute and not by this section.
The State of Kansas has made a similar holding with
respect to a statute of limitations governing penalties in
the State of Kansas. In Frame vs. Ashley, 59 Kansas 477
and 478, 53 Pacific 474 and 475, the three years statute of
limitations was held to apply to an action against a bank
officer for receiving deposits in an insolvent bank where
the purpose of the action was for recovery of the deposit.
The sole question there was whether the action was upon
a liability created by statute or upon a statute for penalty
or forfeiture. In the opinion it was said:
"The general rule is that a statutory obligation to pay
damages which the common law does not give is a
liability created by statute where the damages
awarded are limited to compensation and are limited
to an amount which makes the injured party whole.
The general rule also is that a statutory obligation to
pay an amount beyond compensation, to submit to
more than simple redress of the wrong done, to pay
not merely in respect of the deserts of the injured
person but as punishment for a wrong doing is a
penalty.''
Referring to the statute giving a mortgagor the right
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to recover $100.00 for failure to release a satisfied mortgage, the opinion said:
''There is no analogy between these statutes and the
one under consideration. The latter gives compensation, nothing more, and permits nothing less. The
former gi\·es a fixed sum, irrespective of the damages
actually sustained. Damages from failure to enter
satisfaction of a mortgage may be very great. It may
be that none whatever occurred. Whether great or
small. or none at all, the amount recoverable is fixed
arbitrarily at $100.00."
The conclusion reached was that the statute imposed a
liability for compensation only, that it was remedial and
therefore not barred by the one year statute of limitations. This is comparable to Title 14-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which should therefore not be barred by
the one year statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
The Law of the State of Utah has recognized the majority ruling that legislative acts are to be given prospective interpretation except where the Legislature has
clearly indicated otherwise. The application of this rule
of Law would require that the three year statute of limitation be applied in the case at Bar.
The cases also appear to support the proposition that
pending actions are not affected by a Law changing the
applicable statute of limitation.
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The Plaintiff therefore prays that the Order of the District Court dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint, be reversed
and that the case be remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
WATKINS, PACE & WATKINS
Lorin N. Pace
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah

